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QUANTITATIVE RESEARCH: A DISPUTE




A perusal of Federal Trade Commission (FTC) activities directed at
suspected deceptive advertising practices in the past few years reveals a vast
preponderance of cases terminating in consent decrees.' Some probable con-
tributors to this popularity of prosecutorial preemption are the time and cost
of seeing litigation to its end, the track record for successful prosecution by
the Commission staff, and the detrimental publicity generated by an adverse
decision in an adjudicated dispute. None of these factors, however, bear
directly upon the merits of an FTC complaint-whether the meaning con-
veyed by an ad really is deceptive-but simply act as a deterrent to pursuing
the full course of litigation. Adoption of a dispute resolution mechanism
based upon empirical assessment of the deceptive likelihood of advertising
could be implemented early in the administrative process and long before the
major costs of litigation are incurred. Such a mechanism would offer a viable
alternative to the failings of adjudication and the traditional use of consent
decrees by looking directly to the merits of the charges made against an
advertiser. Although the meaning of an advertisement is not the only issue
faced in the regulation of promotional messages, adoption of this litigatory
alternative would represent substantial progress in the present system of pro-
secution.
This article proposes such a procedure and discusses the potential problems
and benefits to be encountered in promulgating this contemporary approach
to legal problem solving. The procedure is predicated on the idea that if an
advertisement can beproved deceptive before enduring the cost and publicity
of traditional FTC procedures, there will be no advantage to the advertiser in
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challenging the allegation. Conversely, if the FTC receives convincing proof
that consumers are not likely to be deceived by an advertising claim, it will
probably dismiss the complaint rather than risk the embarrassment and cost
of pursuing a lost cause. Additionally, a regulatory system based upon the
measured fact of consumer perception of an ad's meaning represents a more
equitable approach than one based upon what a few commissioners may
guess that consumers believe an ad to say.2
Finally, such a system can lend greater consistency to regulation. Without
a systematic and consistent approach to research, no advertiser can be
assured of equal and fair treatment in the research process, which is essential
to adoption of the procedure by the advertising community. Consistency of
approach may also provide a more global benefit of giving the FTC some in-
sight into the true nature of deception, as patterns begin to emerge in the
results of these studies. If, for instance, behavioral research in several cases
should discover the phrase "new and improved" to consistently create
misconceptions in the minds of consumers, those tests could serve as the
basis for subsequent limitations on the use- of this phrase. In the same man-
ner, claims traditionally thought to be deceptive per se may well be
discovered to be nondeceptive in many or all circumstances.3
As proposed here, the application of the procedure demands two separate
steps by the FTC: (1) the development of formal research guidelines for the
2. One review of advertising regulation notes:
Studies of the sources of consumer information, of the influence that different
kinds of information have on the purchase decision, and of the importance of fac-
tors such as brand loyalty or experience with a product, reveal that deception is a
very complex process which is not always assessable merely by looking at the face
of an ad. This research suggests that the FTC's assumptions about the persuasive
effects of advertising may not conform to empirical realities concerning the causes
of consumer product choices.
Comment, Federal Trade Commission Deceptive Advertising Regulation: A Proposal for the
Use of Consumer Behavior Research, 76 Nw. U.L. REv. 946, 947 (1982) (emphasis added).
3. One incident of such a mistaken belief by the FTC, where empirical research revealed the
misconception, occurred when the Commission went overboard in its attempts to protect
children from the undue influence of advertisers.
In 1974 the 'TC proposed a rule prohibiting certain advertising directed at children, where
products were promoted by flaunting the inclusion of "premiums." Federal Trade Commission,
Proposed Trade Regulation Rule Regarding Premiums in Children's Advertising, 39 Fed. Reg.
25,505 (1974). The Commission felt that appeals of this variety, such as selling breakfast cereal
with toys buried inside, encourage children to ask for products based upon the premiums
associated with the product. Thii, in turn, discourages the children from learning proper buying
habits and how to judge the relative merits of competing products. This proposal was followed
by a research project which found that, to the contrary, under some conditions the attention of
children to the premium would act as a catalyst to prompt the child to learn more about the pro-
duct. Shimp, Dyer & Divita, Experimental Test of the Harmful Effects of Premium-oriented
Commercials on Children, 3 J. CONS. REs. 1 (1976). The proposed rule was eventually
withdrawn. Research findings in that example discovered that children were not necessarily as
gullible as common wisdom would suggest, and it is certainly within reason to suspect that other
regulations or Commission decisions might be found equally overcautious, or even lacking in
sufficient cauticn, as patterns emerge in individual case studies.
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conduct of quantitative research, and (2) the implementation of a model that
applies behavioral research to an early determination of the facts at issue.
Part I of this article reviews the values of behavioral research and argues for
formalized methodological direction. Part II proposes informal prelitigation
resolution of the issues related to the conveyed meaning of an advertisement.
I. Empirical Research Standards
The Need for Behavioral Research
The FTC standard of deception is predicated on consumer misunderstand-
ings, rather than on any finding of fault or impropriety by the advertiser.'
Thus, the perception of the consumer is quintessential to its proper applica-
tion.5 Explicit claims in advertising are largely measurable for accuracy at the
point they are transmitted, with no need to measure how the message is
received. If a product is promoted, for example, by a claim that it will in-
crease gasoline mileage in an automobile by 20 percent and it is unable to do
so, this claim is easily measured and disproved.6 But, advertisements formu-
lated around sex, status, or other emotional appeals convey misinformation
indirectly through implication' and, therefore, are not so easily measured.'
An example would be a vitamin supplement that claims to help "iron-poor
blood" and seems to imply that this malady is common in persons who fre-
quently feel tired.9 Deciding whether this implication is made by the advertis-
ing in question is not quite so simple. It is in just such a situation that the
utility of behavioral research can be realized because such research can probe
what consumers actually believe the ad to mean.
A recent FTC decision, Thompson Medical Co. , addressed the proof of
both explicit and implicit claims. The former, it declares, are "ones that
directly state the representation at issue. Because the message is stated un-
equivocally, it is reasonable to interpret the ads as intending to make the
claim."" Implied claims, on the other hand, range from those that are very
nearly explicit to those that barely suggest some claim. Thus, the Commis-
sion uses several fact-finding tools to assess the potential deceptiveness of im-
plications:
4. Neither intent nor bad faith need be shown to sustain a charge of deception, since they
are not elements of the violation. Beneficial Corp. v. FTC, 542 F.2d 611, 617 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 430 U.S. 983 (1976); FTC v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 317 F.2d 669, 674 (2d Cir. 1963);
Feil v. FTC, 285 F.2d 879, 896 (9th Cir. 1960).
5. See the discussion of consumer perception of advertising in Richards & Zakia, Pictures:
An Advertiser's Expressway Through FTC Regulation, 16 GA. L. Ray. 77 (1981).
6. Cliffdale, 103 F.T.C. 110 (1984).
7. For a more complete treatment of emotionally conditioning advertising techniques, see
Richards & Zakia, supra note 5. See also B. GARDiNR, A CONCEPTUAL FRAMWORK FOR ADvER-
TXSnSo (1982).
8. See infra note 20.
9. J.B. Williams Co. v. FTC, 381 F.2d 884 (6th Cir. 1967).
10. 104 F.T.C. 648 (1984), aff'd, 791 F.2d 189 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
11. 104 F.T.C. at 788.
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One is to look at the evidence from the advertisement itself. We
often conclude that an advertisement contains an implied claim by
evaluating the contents of the advertisement and the circum-
stances surrounding it. This technique is primarily useful in
evaluating advertisements whose language or depictions are clear
enough, though not express, for us to conclude with confidence
after examining the interaction of all the different elements in
them that they contain a particular implied claim.
If our initial review of evidence from the advertisement itself
does not allow us to conclude with confidence that it is reasonable
to read an advertisement as containing a particular implied
message, we will not find the ad to make the implied claim unless
extrinsic evidence allows us to conclude that such a reading of the
ad is reasonable.'
2
Although evidence outside the bare advertisement is unnecessary for ex-
plicit falsities, the regulators may actually demand some additional eviden-
tiary showing of deceptive likelihood before they will decide the fate of an
advertising message. To find whether a deceptive implication is actually con-
veyed to consumers can best be decided by looking not to the message but to
the receiver. Consequently, the external evidence favored by the FTC is em-
pirical behavioral research:
The extrinsic evidence we prefer to use and to which we give
great weight is direct evidence of what consumers actually thought
upon reading the advertisement in question. Such evidence will be
in the form of consumer survey research for widely distributed
ads.... Where we use surveys in lieu of individual testimony, the
surveys are methodologically sound; they draw valid samples from
the appropriate population, ask appropriate questions in ways
that minimize bias, and analyze results correctly.
3
While other forms of evidence are used and considered acceptable by the
Commission,' t is clear from both the nature of implied claims and the posi-
tion of the FTC that consumer behavior research is the best possible form of
evidence when nonexplicit appeals are encountered.
The implied manner of appeal has proliferated over the past years, exacer-
bating the already problematic job of regulating advertising. A few years
ago, FTC Commissioner Mary Gardiner Jones made the following statement:
The present public policy in advertising is to produce truth and
honesty. An interesting question is whether the existence of that
policy is pushing advertising away from direct product claims
12. Id. at 789.
13. Id. See generally Preston, Data-Free at the FTC? How the Federal Trade Commission
Decides Whether Ertrinsic Evidence of Deceptiveness is Required, 24 AM. Bus. L.J. 359 (1986).
14. Thompson, 104 F.T.C. at 790.
[Vol. 40:593
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which can be validated and subject to the F.T.C. Act, into some
of the less definable, less verifiable product claims and advertising
themes including this kind of psychological associating with indi-
vidual status and anxieties. I don't think it is completely true, but
we have to remember in formulating public policy that the so-
called "cure" might push people into doing things which are more
objectionable than the original problem to which the "cure" was
designed to be applicable.'
5
A suitable "cure" must address the fact that product attributes can be
either objective, product-centered features or subjective, consumer-centered
benefits. As Holbrook describes the difference, 6 "factual" advertisements
emphasize "logical, objectively verifiable descriptions of tangible product
features,"' 7 and "evaluative" advertisements describe the "emotional, sub-
jective impressions of intangible aspects of the product.""s A factual claim
might say "X product contains no sugar." An evaluative claim, on the other
hand, may state "X product will make you sexy."
A striking discovery of Holbrook's research is that, though factual
messages may be most effective in favorably influencing some beliefs (at least
for well-educated consumers buying relatively technical products), emotional
appeals were barely distinguishable from the factual ones in their influence
on the consumer. Indeed, a review of pertinent research by Rotfeld and
Preston found virtually no difference between these two forms of sales pat-
15. Jones, The Cultural and Social Impact of Advertising on American Society, 80SGOODE
HAU.L.J. 65, 87 (1970). Many advertising scholars have made similar observations about the
trend of modem advertising techniques. Professor Terence A. Shimp, at the University of South
Carolina-Columbia, remarks:
Regulatory agencies have generally assumed a more aggressive position in performing
their statutory mandates: The FTC, for example, has expanded and intensified its ef-
forts to regulate unfair and deceptive business practices.... The irony of the FrC's
expanded regulatory activity is that there probably has not been any significant diminu-
tion in the extent of advertising deception. What has occurred instead is that blatant
deception has been replaced with subtle forms. Regulatory pressure has likely led adver-
tisers to resort to less discernible forms of advertising misrepresentation as a means
of avoiding FrC detection.
Shimp, Social Psychological (Mis)Representations in Television Advertising, 13 J. CoNs. AF.
28, 28-29 (1979). See also Resnick & Stem, An Analysis of the Information Content in Televi-
sion Advertising, 41 J. MKTG. 50 (1977); Shimp & Preston, Deceptive and Nondeceptive Conse-
quences of Evaluative Advertising, 45 J. MKTG. 22 (1981).
16. Holbrook, Beyond Attitude Structure: Toward the Informational Determinants of Attitude,
15 J. MKTO. 545 (1978). See also Shimp & Preston, supra note 15. Nonfactual types of appeals
have been discussed extensively by behavioral researchers and have been called, variously: "social-
psychological," Shimp, supra note 15; "feeling," Golden & Johnson, The Impact of Sensory
Preference and Thinking Versus Feeling Appeals in Advertising Effectiveness, 10 ADvANcED CoNs.
Rns. 203 (1983); "arbitrary," Preston, Theories of Behavior and the Concept of Rationality
in Advertising, 17 J. Comm. 211 (1967); and "social reality" appeals, Mizerski & Settle, The
Influence of Social Character on Preference for Social Versus Objective Information in Adver-
tising, 16 J. MKcTo. Rrs. 552 (1979).
17. Holbrook, supra note 16, at 547.
18. Id.
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ter.19 In other words, emotional ploys had an impact on the public very
nearly as persuasive as hard facts."0 Additionally, it appears that advertisers
use such techniques with abandon, a large majority of ads being of the emo-
tional genre.
2'
These emotional devices present peculiar difficulties when compared to
regulating factual misclaims. Because emotional claims may be interpreted
differently by each consumer, the regulatory agency will find it difficult to
determine the number of consumers to which each interpretation is conveyed.
Objective consumer research obviously is superior to the necessarily subjec-
tive Commission expertise as a way of enabling the FTC to determine the
likelihood of emotional devices to mislead.
22
In summary, just as implied claims are harder to handle than explicit
claims, so are emotional claims harder than factual claims. And either of the
latter may take either explicit or implied form. For example, while the state-
ment, "X product will make you sexy," is explicit, it is evaluative, and the
same claim might be implied by picturing a man and a woman in an intimate







..." -:-',..: : .. : . . :. ....
T c.i e .... -. -o. .C, L.... ,
197) Roed&rso, The Pogictal Impact of echo Advertising anteNedo 21C Reguation,
t.o n. 197 .s..L. ..1..
Taichniqusky: Fryer, Regulation Han' ChoioalongVdsMuch!,ng AdOertisiSg, Q1. 438 (198.3
.7) d P , tn  t  Re ti i  Law, t2e J.e ADVF Eguaton
13 Am. Bus. LJ. 171 (1975); Comment, Psychological Advertising A New Area of FTCRegula-
tion, 1972 Wis. L. Ri'v. 1097.
21. One empiric'al study determined that twice as many advertisements consist of basic per-
suasion as those. consisting of basic information. Marquez, Advertising Content: Persuasion,
Information or Intimidation?, 54 JouRgNAism Q. 482 (1977). Another study appears in Pollay,
Zaichkowsky & Fryer, Regulation Hasn't Changed TVAds Much!, 57 JOURNASmm Q. 438 (1980).
22. LaRue, FTC Expertise. A Legend Examined, 16 AN TrBULL. 1 (1971), criticizes
the concept of def.-rence to Commission findings by the courts, arguing that the diversity of
the FTC jurisdiction and the backgrounds of the individual commissioners make any significant
degree of expertise an impossibility.
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The Commission indicates that consumer research is useful for implied
claims, but Holbrook's study suggests that such evidence would be equally
useful for explicit claims that concern evaluative product attributes. The
shaded area in the figure depicts the areas of potential application of
behavioral studies. Any claim that is both explicit and factual can be assessed
by the advertisement on its face, but all others demand external evidence if
they are to be adequately judged.
Although there is clearly value in the application of consumer research,
there are practical impediments to fully effectuating its use. The next section
presents some of these hurdles that must be cleared to optimize this method
of fact finding.
Regulatory Reluctance
Over the past decade, the FTC has become more receptive to behavioral
data, which is clearly evidenced by a notable increase in the number of cases
in which such data have been presented. 23 FTC procedures and guidance in
the past did not promote the use of more systematic and scientific analysis of
consumer beliefs. 24 Despite the increased prevalence of behavioral data, there
has been little improvement in this area. 21 For instance, no guidelines have
been promulgated to describe what scientific procedures are presumptively
acceptable to the Commission as proof of innocence of the advertisers, nor is
there any clear definition as to how many consumers must be misled by an ad
for it to be indefensibly deceptive. 26 The Commission has been reticent in
formally addressing this need.
What the regulators need to determine is consumer perceptions of the
advertised product resulting from the advertisements. However, the
23. Preston, supra note 13, at 361.
24. Gellhorn, Proof of Consumer Deception Before the Federal Trade Commission, 17 U.
KAN. L. REv. 559 (1969).
25. Barnes, The Significance of Quantitative Evidence in Federal Trade Commission Decep-
tive Advertising Cases, 46 L. & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 25 (1983).
26. Commissioners Pertschuk and Bailey, criticizing the Commissions' Policy Statement on
Deception in Cliffdale, 103 F.T.C. 110, 174 (1984), state that:
The Commission has never identified a minimum percentage of consumers who must
be misled in order to find deception; nor has it identified any percentage as "per se"
substantial. Indeed those decisions that have discussed extrinsic evidence as to the percent-
ages of consumers who could be misled suggest that the number of consumers ade-
quate to constitute a "substantial number" will vary depending on the nature of the
claim and the consequences of the deception. Generally, twenty or twenty-five percent
may be considered a substantial number. However, a smaller percentage may be suffi-
cient if physical injury or large monetary loss could result from consumers being misled.
Analysis of the Law of Deception, enclosure in letter from Chairman Miller to Congressman
John D. Dingell (Feb. 28, 1984). Though prior case law does indicate some figures considered
proper by the Commission, the recent stance of the Commission being attacked in that statement
adds somewhat to the uncertainty. It is likely, however, that many former cases turn on percentages
of evidenced deception that would be found to be inadequate for prosecution under today's
attitudes. See Preston & Richards, Consumer Miscomprehension as a Challenge to FTC Prosecu-
tions of Deceptive Advertising, 19 J. M.assAL, L. Rav. 605, 609-15 (1986).
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1987
OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:593
regulators sometimes ignore direct evidence of such perceptions, 2 and they
make no attempt to confirm those perceptions by obtaining them directly
from consumers. Instead, the FTC applies its own expertise/opinion as to
what may deceive the public, 28 and it gives little indication where it acquired
this omniscient perception of public response.29
Although the Commission has increased its interest in behavioral research
in recent years and has claimed a preference for it in some circumstances, 30 it
has taken no active measures to assist or encourage the introduction of
surveys or other measures of perceptions into its evaluations of deception."
27. This problem extends well beyond advertising regulation. One additional example is the
area of "obsc.nity" regulation. See Richards, Obscenity and Film: An Empirical Dilemma, 6
Loy. ENT. L.J. 7 (1986); Bates, Pornography and the Expert Witness, 20 CaIM. L.Q. 250 (1978);
Lamont, Public Opinion Polls and Survey Evidence in Obscenity Cases, 15 CaMs. L.Q. 135
(1972-73); Stern, Toward a Rationale for the Use of Expert Testimony in Obscenity Litigation,
20 CASE W. REs. L. Rv. 527 (1969).
28. The FTC often makes no attempt to poll public perceptions, beliefs, or attitudes for
the purpose of gauging such a likelihood-to-mislead. A content analysis conducted on all 3,337
cases that appeared in FTC Decisions during the period from the FTC's inception in 1914 through
1973 reveals that only 206 of those cases involved any showing of consumer perception, and
of those, 194 were simply instances where consumers hand-picked by one or both of the parties
were brought in to testify. It appears that up until 1974 only 12 cases involved surveys that
may have had some scientific validity of "representativeness" of the buying public. Brandt &
Preston, The Federal Trade Commission's Use of Evidence to Determine Deception, 41 J. MKTo.
54 (1977). Internad Commission evidence was found applied in 94.7% of the cases examined.
The Seventh Circuit in 1944, long before survey research methods reached their present sophistica-
tion, upheld the ability of the Commission to determine deceptive tendencies in lieu of such evidence.
The Commision was not required to sample public opinion to determine what the
petitioner was representing to the public. The Commission had a right to look at the
advertisements in question, consider the relevant evidence in the record that would
aid it in interpreting the advertisement, and then to decide for itself whether the prac-
tices engaged in by the petitioner were unfair or deceptive.
Zenith Radio Corp. v. FTC, 143 F.2d 29, 31 (7th Cir. 1944). But see Rotfeld & Preston, supra
note 19, which finds a recent trend toward greater use of survey evidence. See generally Preston,
supra note 13. Deceptive advertising is measured against a ruler of whether the subject com-
munication has a "capacity or tendency" (see FTC v. Standard Educ. Soc'y, 302 U.S. 112 (1937);
Beneficial Corp. -. FTC, 542 F.2d 611 (3d Cir. 1976); Jacob Siegel Co. v. FTC, 150 F.2d 751
(3d Cir. 1944); Aronberg v. FTC, 132 F.2d 165 (7th Cir. 1942); Newton Tea & Spice Co. v.
United States, 28F F. 475 (6th Cir. 1923)), or "likelihood" to mislead the public. It should be
recognized that there is no consensus regarding what percentage of the public represents suffi-
cient deception, or with what probability, to justify remedial legal action. This is particularly
true given the decision in Cliffdale, 103 F.T.C. 110 (1984), which misstates the former standard
as "tendency and capacity" to deceive, thereby subtly altering history. Id. at 165. Through this
misrepresentation the Commission justified changing its stated standard to a more strict
"likelihood" probability. See Preston & Richards, supra note 26.
29. "Why questions of meaning should be submitted to the virtually unreviewable discretion
of five commissioners of the FTC has never been articulated .... [There is no reason to believe
that commissioners of the FTC have unusual capacity or experience in coping with questions
of meaning." Pitcfsky (writing as former Commissioner), Beyond Nader: Consumer Protection
and the Regulation of Advertising, 90 HARv. L. R-v. 661, 678 (1977).
30. See supra text accompanying note 13.
31. Though the Commission has done nothing to aid defendants charged with unfair or decep-
tive advertising practices to introduce evidence of this variety, there is some degree of "encourage-
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol40/iss4/13
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Even if defendants desire to present evidence of this variety, the FTC offers
them no formal direction as to what methodologies will be recognized as
scientifically valid.
In 1916, Louis D. Brandeis, author of the famed "Brandeis Brief" that in-
troduced quantitative methodology to the law,32 made the following com-
ment about the need for integration of various other disciplines with the law:
"The judge came to the bench unequipped with the necessary knowledge of
economic and social science, and his judgment suffered likewise through lack
of equipment in the lawyers who presented cases to him. For a judge rarely
performs his functions adequately unless the case before him is adequately
presented." 3 This remark of seventy years ago still applies. The Commission
seems better equipped to deal with evidence that is more familiar to legal ad-
vocacy than public perceptions, even if it is willing to consider perceptual
data.
The meaning of an ad in the mind of a consumer, however, is a question
of fact, not of law.14 The primary fault, where advertising litigation circum-
vents a fact-finding approach to consumer beliefs, lies not upon the Commis-
sion, whose function is akin to a judge. It is, rather, the fault of the ad-
vocates presenting these cases for neglecting to offer proof of consumer
beliefs beyond the scientifically invalid testimony of purposively selected con-
sumers or the unqualified opinions of supposed "experts. ' 35
Lawyers, as a rule, tend to avoid and mistrust quantitative data. This ap-
prehension by the profession continues despite the growth of quantification
techniques and approaches in legal analyses.3 6 In reality, terms like "weight
ment" to develop this evidence, stemming from respondents' opportunity to observe the FTC's
increasing dependency on consumer opinion data to support its own position.
32. The "Brandeis Brief" was filed in the case of Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
It successfully defended an Oregon statute providing a ten-hour maximum workday for women.
The brief included a mere two pages of legal argument and in excess of one hundred pages
of statistical matter regarding the economic and physiological issues involved. See M. UROFsKY,
A MIND OF ONE PIECE: BRANDEis A AAMEucAN REFORm (1971).
33. Brandeis, The Living Law, 10 ILL. L. REv. 461, 470 (1916).
34. Continental Wax Corp. v. FTC, 330 F.2d 475, 477 (1964); Kroger Co., 98 F.T.C. 639,
726 (1981).
35. In the past these "experts" have not even needed to be experts on attitudes or percep-
tions. For example, in Charles of the Ritz Distrib. Corp. v. FTC, 143 F.2d 676 (2d Cir. 1944),
a dermatologist was qualified as an expert to testify as to what the "average woman" would
believe the name "Rejuvenescence" to mean, even after he testified that a skin cream by this
name might cause a woman to believe that it is "something which would actually cause her
youth to be restored." Id. at 680. A finding by the Commission that this name had a capacity
to deceive, based on such evidence, was upheld. Id
36. Silas, Law Plus: Social Reseach Use is Rising, 70 A.B.A. J. 39 (Nov. 1984), quotes Pro-
fessor John Heinz, Northwestern University School of Law: "Judges are skeptical and somewhat
fearful about evaluating statistical information. If it's a question of social science, they may
say, 'I know this,' but if it's a chemical question, they know they don't know the answer."
Id. See generally Rosenberg, Quantitative Methods for Judges, Lawyers and Law Teachers, in
COMMUNICATION SCENCES AND LAW: REFLECTIONS FROM THE JURIuETIUCS CONFRENCE 171 (L.
Allen & M. Caldwell eds. 1965).
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of evidence" and "balancing of interests" are quantitative legal theories."
So too is "likely to mislead." While the number of prospective purchasers re-
quired to be potentially deceived in order to invoke legal sanction is a ques-
tion of law, the likelihood-to-mislead is a question of fact; the social scien-
tists' empirical tools, available to the lawyer, are techniques probative of
these facts.
38
This is not to say, however, that there is nothing that can be done by the
Commission, procedurally, to aid and provide direction for presentation of
this information.39 These fact-finding methods are less speculative than Com-
mission expertise and should consequently be promoted as a means of testing
the charges of an FTC complaint. The following sections explore the possible
steps that might be taken by the Commission to assist advocates who are pur-
suing empirical data to measure deception and show how these steps can play
a role in the institution of a quantitative dispute resolution process.
Formal Versus Informal Methodological Guidance
While the FTC has yet to issue a policy statement or to promulgate regula-
tions regarding presumptively acceptable research methods, many of the
Commission's decisions speak to various aspects of this problem.40 This
record amounts to an informal statement of policy. However, it exists in
many disparate pieces rather than being synthesized into a single statement.
And, unfortunately, such a record often requires inferring what is allowed in-
directly from what is forbidden.
There are two existing models that the FTC might follow in creating a for-
mal policy toward research on the messages conveyed by advertisements. The
first is its own record of evidence on substantiation of conveyed claims and
the second is that of a sister agency, the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA). These two examples are discussed in turn.
37. Ball, The Trial Court: Probability Theory and Jury Issues, in CoMMuNiCArioN ScmNCas
AND LAW: RiEFLCTIONS FROM TE JURIMETRICS CONFERENCE 179-90 (L. Allen & M. Caldwell
eds. 1965), gives examples where many of these legal approaches to probability make inadequate
or even incorrect assumptions.
38. A discussion of the relevancy of scientific evidence appears in Note, Evolving Methods
of Scientific Proof, 13 N.Y.L.F. 679 (1967) (citing Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C.
Cir. 1923)). The article recognizes that the basic principle of admissibility of a scientific tech-
nique is its "general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs." Id. at 682.
39. Professor Ernest Gellhorn, evaluating the methods used for proving deception in FTC
advertising cases, claimed: "Until the FTC establishes sensible ground rules for the preparation
and presentation of surveys in cases where consumer understanding is a significant issue ...
the partisan survey is an unduly risky, expensive, and time-consuming method for one party
to prove as single issue in the case." Gellhorn, supra note 24, at 567.
40. For example, the recent analgesics cases: American Home Prod., 98 F.T.C 136 (1981),
modified, American Home Prod. v. FTC, 695 F.2d 681 (3d Cir. 1982); Bristol-Myers Co., 102
F.T.C. 21 (1983); Sterling Drug, 102 F.T.C. 395 (1983); Thompson Med., 104 F.T.C. 648 (1984),
aff'd, Thompson Med. v. FTC, 791 F.2d 189 (D.C. Cir. 1986). See Preston, "Extrinsic Evidence
in FTC Deceptiveness Cases," CoLuM. Bus. L. Rav. (1987, in press).
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FTC Policy on Evidence of Substantiation
Once the FTC has determined the messages conveyed by allegedly decep-
tive advertisements, the next step is to determine whether such claims actually
are deceptive. To avoid deceptiveness, marketers are required to have a
"reasonable basis" or substantiation for their claims, often based on scien-
tific testing, before the advertisement's first dissemination.' This is the basis
of the Commission's advertising substantiation program.
4 2
While there are certain obvious differences between testing product attri-
butes and surveying public perceptions of an advertisement, both demand
some standard of scientific certainty and both are vulnerable to inadequacies
in their measurement reliability and validity. Explanation of acceptable scien-
tific procedures can minimize speculation by concerned parties when attempt-
ing in good faith to avoid deceptiveness.
It is significant, then, to observe that the FTC has shown a somewhat
greater degree of formality in the substantiation area than it has in the matter
of determining conveyed messages. In particular, it has issued a policy in the
substantiation area, which contains statements such as:
The Commission's determination of what constitutes a reasonable
basis depends, as it does in an unfairness analysis, on a number of
factors relevant to the benefits and costs of substantiating a partic-
ular claim. These factors include: the type of claim, the product,
the consequences of a false claim, the benefits of a truthful claim,
the cost of developing substantiation for the claim, and the amount
of substantiation experts in the field believe is reasonable.
43
This is not to say that there is no room for FTC improvement in this
area.4 4 Much more could be done in expanding the formal statement, parti-
41. See Federal Trade Comm'n Report, Federal Trade Commission Policy Statement Regard-
ing Advertising Substantiation Program, 48 Fed. Reg. 10,471 (1983), 47 A.T.R.R. 234 (1984),
appended to Thompson Med., 104 F.T.C. 648, 839 (1984). See also Sears, Roebuck & Co. v.
FTC, 676 F.2d 385, 395-96 (9th Cir. 1982); National Dynamics Corp. v. FTC, 492 F.2d 1333,
1336 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 993 (1974); Pfizer, Inc., 81 F.T.C. 23 (1972); FTC Staff
Report, Evolution and Evaluation of the Ad Substantiation Program since 1971 (Dec. 1, 1978);
Preston, Description and Analysis of FTC Order Provisions Resulting from References in Adver-
tising to Tests of Surveys, 14 PEPPERnnE L. REv. 229 (1986) (Although many of the same research
principles are involved, the article examines research not on the messages conveyed by adver-
tisements, but rather on the truth or falsity of the conveyed claims); Comment, Ad Substantia-
tion Program: You Can Fool All of the People Some of the Time, But Can You Fool the FTC?,
30 Am. U. L. RPv. 429 (1981).
42. Federal Trade Commission Policy Statement, supra note 41.
43. Id. at 840.
44. Even in the substantiation area there has been criticism by advertisers that FTC requirements
are unduly vague and imprecise. See, e.g., Bristol-Myers Co. v. FTC, 738 F.2d 554, 560 (2d
Cir. 1984). The agency seems anxious to embrace the dictum from Pfizer, 81 F.T.C. 23, 64
(1972), that the amount of evidence required to substantiate a claim can only be determined
on a "case-by-case basis." See Sperry Corp., DKG Adv., Inc., North Am. Philips Corp., and
McCaffrey & McCall, Inc., 104 F.T.C. 549 (1984).
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cularly in synthesizing the principles that can be derived from all of the perti-
nent cases. dthough certain advertisers attacked by the Commission pro-
bably ought to have known of their research inadequacies on the basis of
knowledge obtainable from the research community, it is at least arguable
that the FTC may have contributed to certain instances of deceptiveness by
failing to provide guidelines showing that it was aware of the standards of
the research community and was insistent that advertisers follow them. 4 1
Despite these problems, the FTC might reasonably provide specifications
for research on conveyance of messages that are at least as detailed as what it
has accomplished in the substantiation area. The law provides the agency
with powers and procedures by which it is able to promulgate either industry
guides" or regulations that can resolve many of the ambiguities remaining
in the conduct of proper research. Regulations or guides could lead scientists
by the hand through research processes that will have the presumptive accept-
ance of the Commission and therefore may be assumed to be valid in creating
evidence to defend alleged misconduct.
Policy of a Sister Agency
The FDA has been even more formal than the FTC in promulgating its re-
quirements for a threshold of acceptable scientific methodology. 4" When sub-
mitting an application for approval of a new drug to the FDA, the applicant
must prove the drug's effectiveness before gaining the agency's acceptance.
Sufficiency of that proof requires a showing of "substantial evidence" of the
45. One o! the first such cases was Warner-Lambert Co., 86 F.T.C. 1398 (1975), modified,
562 F.2d 749 (P.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 950 (1978), contesting the manufacturer's
promotional claim that Listerine can cure or prevent colds, bringing into question an experiment's
failure to provide adequate "blinding" of the control group used, even though the experimenter
incorporated one form of blinding in the test design. 86 F.T.C. at 1509-12. The concept of
"blinding," as used here, involves treating the control group with a placebo to minimize the
bias that might occur if some participants do not feel they are receiving the benefit of a treat-
ment that the experimental group expects to accrue from their treatment. The mere expectation by the
experimental group can result in a reported benefit, even though the treatment itself offers no
real value. The Commission simply declared the procedure inadequate and went on to imply
that a new study would have to be a "double-blind" design. Id. at 1510 n.l and 1511. This
procedure not only "blinds" the control group but also the observer, where this examiner would
not know which subjects were receiving the treatment and which ones received only a placebo.
In this case the company offers substantiation of its claim, but it turns out not to be reasonable
enough in the eyes of the public's guardians. Later cases reveal that there continues to be a
problem with insufficient guidance, even after Warner-Lambert. See, e.g., Kroger Co., 98 F.T.C.
639 (1981), modified, 100 F.T.C. 573 (1982); Litton Indus. 97 F.T.C. 1 (1981), modified, 100
F.T.C. 457 (1982); California Milk Prod. Advisory Bd. 94 F.T.C. 429 (1979).
46. 16 C.F.R. § 1.6 (1987). "Guides may relate to a practice common to many industries
or to specific practices of a particular industry." Id. § 1.5 (emphasis added).
47. Id. § 1.7-1.20 (1987). "[T]he Commission is empowered to promulgate trade regulation
rules which define with specificity acts or practices which are unfair or deceptive acts or practices
in or affecting ccmmerce. Such rules may include requirements prescribed for the purpose of
preventing such acts or practices." Id. § 1.8 (emphasis added).
48. The idea of drawing upon the approach of the Food and Drug Administration was recently
espoused in Barnes, supra note 25.
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potion's efficacy.' A further explication of this "substantiation" is des-
cribed by the FDA as consisting of "adequate and well-controlled investiga-
tions, including clinical investigations, by experts qualified by scientific train-
ing and experience to evaluate the effectiveness of the drug." 50 Without addi-
tional definition by the agency it would be impossible, or at the very least ex-
pensive and time-consuming, for a company to acquiesce. A firm might very
likely conduct costly and unnecessary replications of its tests, possibly
resulting in tremendous economic waste, or even erecting an economic bar-
rier to new drug development. Consequently, the FDA promulgated regula-
tions that outline acceptable scientific practices."
The formal guidelines, while dealing specifically with drugs and with the
"hard" sciences, are adoptable in principle by the FTC in its advertising
substantiation program, 2 as well as in its behavioral research of advertising
effects. Emulation by the FTC of its sister agency's standards was recently
49. 21 C.F.R. § 314.111(a)(5)(i) (1984).
50. Id.
51. Id. § 314.111(a)(5)(ii). The most relevant text of these regulations, which would apply
well to FEC standards of scientific evidence, is as follows:
(ii) The following principles have been developed over a period of years and are
recognized by the scientific community as the essentials of adequate and well-controlled
clinical investigations. They provide the basis for the determination where there is
"substantial evidence" to support the claims of effectiveness for "new drugs" and
antibiotic drugs.
(a) The plan or protocol for the study and the report of the results of the effec-
tiveness study must include the following:
(1) A clear statement of the objectives of the study,
(2) A method of selection of the subjects that (i) Provides adequate assurance that
they are suitable for the purposes of the study, diagnostic criteria of the condition
to be treated or diagnosed, confirmatory laboratory tests where appropriate, and, in
the case of prophylactic agents, evidence of susceptibility and exposure to the condi-
tion against which prophylaxis is desired.
(it) Assigns the subjects to test groups in such a way as to minimize bias.
(ii) Assures comparability in test and control groups of pertinent variables, such
as age, sex, severity, or duration of disease, and use of drugs other than the test drug.
(3) Explains the methods of observation and recording of results including the variables
measured, quantitation, assessment of any subjects response, and steps taken to minimize
bias on the part of the subject and observer.
(4) Provides a comparison of the results of treatment or diagnosis with a control
in such a fashion as to permit quantitative evaluation. The precise nature of the con-
trol must be stated and an explanation given of the methods used to minimize bias
on the part of the observers and the analysts of the data. Level and methods of "blind-
ing," if used, are to be documented. Generally, four types of comparison are recognized:
(i) No treatment: ....
(it) Placebo control: . ...
(ii) Active treatment control: ....
(iv) Historical control: ....
(5) A summary of the methods of analysis and an evaluation of data derived from
the study, including any appropriate statistical methods.
Provided, however, That any of the above criteria may be waived in whole or in
part, either prior to the investigation or in the evaluation of a completed study.
52. See supra note 41.
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suggested by an Associate Law Professor and Director of the Center for In-
terdisciplinary Legal Studies at the Syracuse University College of Law,
David W. Barnes." Professor Barnes draws this conclusion:
The goals to be attained through these guidelines are simplifica-
tion and prehearing settlement of evidentiary and legal issues,
cooperation between parties, disclosure of relevant background
materials, and clarification of substantive remedial requirements.
Achievement of these goals will guarantee the integrity of fact-
finding in deceptive advertising cases while intruding in the least
restrictive manner on the free flow of commercial information. 4
Aside from the practical benefits enumerated by Professor Barnes, explicit
parameters of scientific methodology will serve the added function of insulat-
ing the FTC from the charge that its requirements are void for being overly
vague." Where quantitative data is mandated by the Commission, com-
pliance is impossible without offering sufficient direction. Such provisions,
of course, cannot be so restrictive as to prohibit research techniques that are
new, progressive, or unique just because they are not applied by a majority
of researchers. But, like the FDA guidelines, they can be broad while retain-
ing some specifics and could even go a step further by offering a nonexclu-
sive list of presumptively acceptable techniques. This would go far in
assisting behavioral and other empirical researchers."
Professor Barnes' point is well taken, but much of his article overstates the
differences between the FDA and the FTC." While the FTC has promulgated
53. See Barnes, supra note 25.
54. Id. at 43.
55. See generally Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA.
L. REv. 67 (1960). See also Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566 (1974); Dombrowski v. Pfister,
380 U.S. 479, 486 (1965); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963). This principle is fun-
damental in testing the constitutional validity of a regulatory schema. This particular vulnerability
has not yet proved to be a problem for the agency, but the obscurity of its standards as they
presently exist leaves this as an area of potential future attack.
56. See, e.g., Jacoby & Small, The FDA Approach to Defining Misleading Advertising, 39
J. MKT. 65 (1975). These researchers suggest that there is a need to develop a research approach
that can be used to evaluate ads that may require litigation, but that it is first necessary to define
what constitutes "being misled." This would necessitate, for example, some guidance as to how
many consumers need be deceived before regulatory intervention is justified. Bernacchi, Substantive
False Advertising Standards: Discretion and Misinformation By The FTC, 5 J. ADvERTisINo
24, 27 (1976), declares:
The problem with the consumer survey method, presently, aside from its unattractive
cost and time considerations, is its general lack of acceptability as a method of evidence
introduction and the general failure to set standards in areas of a desired sample represen-
tativeness, instrument validity and reliability, an acceptable margin of error for the
data and for data interpretation of the survey findings.
57. The analysis conducted by Professor Barnes also misses a crucial distinction in FTC cases.
He does not acknowledge a difference between the scientific standards applied to substantiation
and the standard for determination of the meaning of an advertisement. There is, necessarily,
a difference between the approaches and rigidity of the physical sciences vis a vis the behavioral
sciences. In addition, where the FTC makes a case decision regarding substantiation of a physicial
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no regulations, it appears to have adopted many of the FDA standards. In
the drug substantiation context, the FTC in American Home Products
echoed many of those standards.5 8 On the other hand, it may be that the
parallel between the FTC and the FDA evident in American Home Products
arises only because of, and is limited to, the fact that this case concerns pro-
ducts that fall under FDA scrutiny. 9 The specific references to substantiation
of drugs makes interpolation of these guidelines to other products, and
especially to consumer perception research, to some extent a matter of
guesswork. Consequently, only a formal declaration of procedures as guides
or regulations, for both physical and behavioral research, can resolve these
inherent ambiguities.
Benefits Beyond Formal Guidelines
Such guidelines by themselves would benefit the search for truth. They
would aid advertisers in (1) determining whether a charged claim is or is not
product attribute, it may not be safe to assume that the threshold of scientific acceptability in
that case will apply equally to the measurement of consumer understanding.
58. 101 F.T.C. 698 (1983), modified, 103 F.T.C. 57 (1984). The FTC required
two or more adequate and well-controlled clinical investigations, conducted by indepen-
dent experts qualified by training and experience to evaluate the comparative effec-
tiveness or comparative freedom from side effects of the drugs involved .... The
investigations shall be conducted in accordance with the procedures set forth below:
At least one of the adequate and well-controlled clinical investigations to evaluate
the comparative effectiveness of the drug shall be conducted on any disease or condi-
tion referred to, directly or by implication, or, if no specific disease or condition is
referred to, then the adequate and well-controlled clinical investigations shall be con-
ducted on at least two conditions or diseases for which the drug is effective. The clinical
investigations shall be conducted as follows:
I. The subjects must be selected by a method that: a. Provides adequate assurance
that they are suitable for the purposes of the investigation, and diagnostic criteria of
the condition to be treated (if any); b. Assigns the subjects to the test groups in such
a way as to minimize bias; and c. Assures comparability in test and control groups
of pertinent variables, such as age, sex, severity or duration of disease or condition
(if any), and use of drugs other than the test drugs.
2. The investigations must be conducted double-blind, and methods of double-
blinding must be documented. In addition, the investigations shall contain a placebo
control to permit comparison of the results of use of the test drugs with an inactive
preparation designed to resemble the test drugs as far as possible.
3. The plan or protocol for the investigations and the report of the results shall
include the following: a. A clear statement of the objective of the investigation; b.
An explanation of the methods of observation and recording of results, including the
variables measured, quantitation, assessment of any subject's response and steps taken
to minimize bias on the part of subject and observer; c. A comparison of the results
of treatments or diagnosis with a control in such a fashion as to permit quantitative
evaluation. The precise nature of the control must be stated and an explanation given
of the methods used to minimize bias on the part of the observers and the analysis
of the data. d. A summary of the methods of analysis and an evaluation of data derived
from the study, including any appropriate statistical methods.
101 F.T.C. at 699-700.
59. This, however, is unlikely. Other cases have voiced many of these standards, though
most of those cases also, admittedly, concern drug product substantiation. See Preston, supra
note 41.
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made by an advertisement, and (2) substantiating the truth of a particular
product claim. Formal guidelines would provide advertisers with presump-
tively acceptable methods of research and would consequently diminish the
probability of proffered research evidence being challenged by the FTC dur-
ings its hearings. This, in turn, would reduce costs by eliminating many
studies that are inherently faulty and by removing the litigation costs
associated with proving and disproving the worth of much scientific
evidence. Finally, this step should be undertaken by the Commission in a
sense of simple fairness to advertisers, so that they can properly (in the view
of the Commission) assess their advertisements for misconveyances or
misclaims before the ads are placed in the public domain where they risk
challenge by the regulators. This would better serve the FTC's prophylactic
purpose than its current ethereal policy.60
A second step supplementing the first would apply behavioral research to
assess deceptiveness, with an eye toward extrajudicial resolution of the facts
at issue. This approach would be based upon objective measures of public
beliefs and aphions and could accurately assess whether a misrepresentation
is material.6 This can be achieved by looking, as we did with the FDA
regulations, to another organization as a model.
II. The Arbitration Model
A dispute resolution model for a prehearing empirical assessment of decep-
tive tendencies of challenged advertisements can be constructed by drawing
from traditional contract arbitration procedures. 2 The purpose of arbitra-
tion, like the intention here, is to provide a system of conflict reduction that
is "better, more expeditious, and more economical than litigation."' 3
One of the greatest benefits to be realized from empirical studies is the
economic factor of avoiding costly trials or administrative hearings, which
can be substantial for the parties concerned. This can be achieved by a scien-
60. The Third Circuit, in Regina Corp. v. FTC, 322 F.2d 765, 768 (3d Cir. 1963), states,
"The purpose of the Federal Trade Commission Act is to protect the public, not to punish a
wrongdoer ... and it is in the public interest to stop any deception at its incipiency." See also
Progress Tailoring Co. v. FTC, 153 F.2d 103, 105 (7th Cir. 1946); Gimbel Bros. v. FTC, 116
F.2d 578, 579 (2d Cir. 1941).
61. One measure of materiality was expressed in Bockenstette v. FTC, 134 F.2d 369, 371
(10th Cir. 1943), which found that a misrepresentation is material where "the natural and prob-
able result of the challenged practice is to cause one to do that which he would not otherwise
do." This is a standard which would be impossible to equitably apply without research into
human behavio:. Any attempt to do otherwise would necessarily involve pure speculation by
the agency. Unrortunately, it is common practice for the FTC to do so.
62. Further information on arbitration can be found at F. Eucoumu & E. Eucouiu, How
ARBrrRATION WoRKs (3d ed. 1973); F. KELLOR, AEmRuCAN ARBrrRATION, ITS HisToRy, FUNC-
TIONS AND AcmorvaEw s (1948); Lippman, Arbitration as an Alternative to Judicial Settlement:
Some Selected Perspectives, 24 ME. L. REv. 215 (1972); Goldstein, The Power of Arbitrators
in Commercial Arbitration, 26 PRAc. LAW. 69 (1980).
63. AmEscjNa ARBIrrRAToN ASS'N, THE ARBITRATOR'S ROLE iN ExPaorriNo rum LAROE AND
Com aLEx COmmERcIL CAsE 2 (1982).
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tific evidentiary showing before the hearing or trial regarding an advertise-
ment's likelihood or unlikelihood to deceive.
Additionally, when surveys or experiments are used in litigation they are
often conducted separately by parties on both sides of the action. This is par-
ticularly true when the methodologies of the studies are in dispute. If,
however, opposing parties will agree upon the manner of testing and agree to
an independent entity by which the appropriate research will be directed, fur-
ther cost reduction will be realized by those involved. Such an agreement will
also immunize the agreed-upon methodology from attack by the regulatory
authorities.
One particular problem with the use of consumer behavior research is that
it can be tainted, reflecting the desires of the sponsor that commissioned it.
As Ernest Gellhorn, then an Associate Professor of Law at Duke University,
charged, "[Plartisanship and accurate surveys are an unlikely mixture.
'"6 4
Agreement of the parties as to the researcher to conduct the study will effec-
tively eliminate this threat to the validity of the findings.
Finally, a great deal has been said about the proliferation of legal actions
and the backlog of cases clogging the court dockets. 63 Administrative agen-
cies also are at a state of perpetual overload. Research that is commissioned
jointly by the FTC and the marketer with the goal of out-of-court (or admin-
istrative hearing) settlement of the issue of deceptiveness might realize a net
reduction in the number of cases being heard by the Commission. It might
also result in a greater number of dispositions of questionable advertising
practices.
These benefits are sufficient in themselves to justify this means of alterna-
tive dispute resolution. However, by avoiding lengthy court dockets and the
time required for answers, replies, counterclaims, voir dire, pretrial hearings,
discovery, and so forth, a noticeable amount of costly time is frequently
saved through the more informal structure of arbitration. It is not unusual
for FTC actions to dwell in the files of the unresolved for three or four
years. 66 Some good examples are the Listerine case, 67 which persisted through
a six-year ordeal after substantial time had already been spent investigating
and preparing the case; the Geritol case, 68 which also took a similar amount
64. Gellhorn, supra note 24, at 567.
65. Admittedly, however, the concern may be somewhat overstated. See Galanter, Reading
the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't Know (and think we know) About Our
Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 4 (1983).
66. One study determined that the average case takes four years. E. Cox, R. FELLMETH &
J. SciuLTz, "THE NADER REPORT" ON TH FEDERAL TRADE CoM IssNo 72 (1969). This inces-
sant delay is referred to in National Dynamics Corp. v. FTC, 492 F.2d 1333, 1335 (2d Cir.
1974), as "the leisurely course typical of FTC proceedings."
67. Warner-Lambert Co., 86 F.T.C. 1398 (1975), modified, 562 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 435 U.S. 950 (1978) (complaint filed in June 1972).
68. J.B. Williams Co., 68 F.T.C. 481 (1965), modified, 381 F.2d 884 (6th Cir. 1967) (com-
plaint filed in December 1962).
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of time; and Carter Products, Inc. ,69 which was more than sixteen years in
reaching a finale."
Beyond these benefits, as consequential as they may be, there is yet one ad-
vantage that may overshadow the others. Arbitration, and the mechanism
recommended herein, are nonpublic. The obvious advantage of this is the
elimination, or minimization, of adverse publicity, which can condemn even
the innocent marketer to an irreparable loss of sales or goodwill.
The Arbitraion Procedure
The premise of the model is that an advertiser, when charged with an in-
fraction of the deception standards of the FTC, should have the option of
collaborating with the agency to the extent that they can jointly hire a social
scientist to explore, through scientific testing, the behavioral impact of the
published claims. To effect this objective it is first necessary for the oppon-
ents to find sufficient common ground to concur on the choice of which
scientist will execute the project.
Here, the arbitration model suggests a particularly effective technique. The
typical system applied in arbitration is for the parties to submit a submission
agreement to the American Arbitration Association (AAA). 72 Upon receipt
of this instrument, the AAA assigns one of its staff members to the case as a
tribunal administrator to oversee the process.
The administrator sends each of the parties a copy of a specially prepared
list of proposed arbitrators who are each technically qualified to resolve the
controversy. The parties are then given seven days to study the list, cross off
any names to which they object, and to number the remaining names by
order of preference. Abstracts of the arbitrators' backgrounds and prior
decisions are available to the parties to assist them in their decision.
Once the administrator receives the lists, the numbered names are com-
pared for mutual selections. If the parties were unable to find a mutual
choice on the list, additional lists may be sent at the request of the parties.
Otherwise, the AAA will make an administrative appointment of its own
choosing. In no case, though, will an arbitrator whose name was crossed out
by either party be appointed.
73
69. Carter Prod. Inc., 47 F.T.C. 1137 (1951), vacated, 201 F.2d 446 (9th Cir.), modified,
346 U.S. 327 (1953); reh. granted, 53 F.T.C. 307 (1956), aff'd, 268 F.2d 461 (9th Cir. 1959)
(complaint filed in May 1943).
70. Though these examples consider only litigated actions, and not consent decrees, the latter
are an unsatisfactory alternative to litigation in many cases because consent may be accepted
by an advertiser even where the allegations of deception are unsubstantiated. Consent decrees
only serve to avoid the expense of litigation at the cost of determining the truth of the accusations.
71. A discussion of the advantages of arbitration appears in Sarpy, Arbitration as a Means
of Reducing Court Congestion, 41 Noan D i LAW. 182 (1966).
72. The American Arbitration Association (AAA) is a private, nonprofit organization established
to "foster the study of arbitration, to perfect its techniques and procedures under arbitration
law, and to advance generally the science of arbitration." A more complete discussion of the
commercial arbitration procedures and background of the AAA can be found in the organiza-
tion's publication, AAA, A CommmALCl ARirrRATiON GrDE FoR Busnass PEoPLr (Apr. 1984).
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An alternative technique is often applied where the amount in controversy
exceeds $25,000. This is known as "tripartite" selection. 4 In this method
each of the parties selects the arbitrator of their preference, and the two
chosen arbitrators then select a third to act as a tie-breaker. Tripartite selec-
tion, however, has met with some resistance and controversy arising from the
ethical dilemma created when normally "impartial" judges are expected to
champion their nominators.7
Advertising Dispute Resolution Model
Adapting this approach to an Advertising Dispute Resolution Model
(ADRM) is a simple matter. To best effect it, however, requires an indepen-
dent administrator. This should present no substantial barrier to success. It is
likely that an appeal to the American Arbitration Association, the American
Sociological Association, the American Association for Public Opinion
Research, or some other financially disinterested organization would quickly
render a volunteer for this function.
The administrator should collect a list of social scientists who are promi-
nent and highly qualified researchers. Members of the sponsoring organiza-
tion could nominate and elect a number of their peers with experience in
advertising research as the "seed" group to form the initial list of ADRM
researchers. This is similar to the AAA program, which takes arbitrators
from nearly all fields of specialization through- nominations by leading
figures in those professions. 76 The initial researchers would then participate
with the administrators in reviewing the qualifications of other candidates for
addition to the list. The team must ensure that researchers outside the spon-
soring agency are also considered. The seed group can be particularly
valuable in assisting the administrator to evaluate, under contemporary scien-
tific standards, the acceptability of the methodologies and theoretical
paradigms of the applicant scientists to guarantee a high quality of research
for ADRM actions.
Before a project is commissioned, a statement of the research questions
must be jointly drafted by the parties. The statement can even outline some
of the research method parameters. If no agreement is forthcoming between
the parties, the hearing examiner should formulate the questions. If the
advertiser does not agree with the questions formulated by the hearing exam-
iner, it will be able to forego the ADRM option and continue through the
conventional regulatory process. If the advertiser opts to continue with the
ADRM, the parties will submit the agreed research questions to the adminis-
trator to initiate the process.
Upon initiation of the ADRM option, the administrator will submit to
73. Id. See also AAA, CONSTRUCTION CONTRACT Dispum: How THEY MAY BE RESOLVED
(Nov. 1980).
74. Roth, Choosing an Arbitration Panel, 6 LMGATION 13, 15 (1980); Glick, Bias, Fraud,
Misconduct and Partiality of the Arbitrator, 22 ARB. J. 161, 170 (1967).
75. Glick, supra note 74.
76. See AAA, supra note 72, at 12.
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both the advertiser and the FTC a list of qualified researchers with a compre-
hensive curriculum vitae of each. The researchers must be capable of re-
searching the questions as outlined in the submission agreement and must be
available to begin the project in the very near future. The parties will then be
allowed seven working days to strike their objections and to number the
balance.
The administrator's next step is to compare the lists and appoint a re-
searcher to conduct the project. It is important that the researcher be in-
sulated from. any knowledge of the preferences made by the parties so that
there will be no bias introduced into the research from any feeling of obliga-
tion by the researcher to either party.
An alternative to this process that might help minimize bias of the adminis-
trator would be for the parties to alternately strike one name at a time on an
odd-numbered list of names until just one name remains, rather than striking
and numbering names and leaving the final decision to another entity. This
would also limit the administrator's responsibility.
Arrangements with the researcher would then be made through the admin-
istrator. No -direct contact by either party should be necessary, or permitted,
unless agreed to by and in the presence of the opposing party. 7 Likewise, the
best results and least bias will attain where there is no contact whatsoever
between the researcher and the parties. The administrator would serve as a
conduit to transmit questions, answers, and. comments between the parties
and the researcher, and the administrator would also be responsible for
documenting all such communications.
Findings
Research results may not be binding upon the FTC without raising a ques-
tion of unlawful delegation of power.78 The Commission is permitted only to
give "some consideration" to any decision on which it seeks the opinion of
some entity outside the FTC. This presents no practical problem, however.
Agreement between the parties as to all factual issues in advance of the study
77. This follows the precedent of the AAA and serves two purposes: It relieves the arbitrator
from the burdens of administration and eliminates the danger that, in the course of conversa-
tions outside the hearing, one party may attempt to influence the arbitrator on the merits of
the case without permitting the other party to rebut the allegations. The same principles apply
to the ADR mechanism.
78. "Admiristrative officers and bodies cannot alienate, surrender, or abridge their powers
and duties, or delegate authority and functions which under the law may be exercised only by
them." Anderson v. Grand River Dam Auth., 446 P.2d 814, 818 (Okla. 1968) (quoting 73 C.J.S.
Public Administrative Bodies and Procedure § 57). Restated as a general legal maxim, State
v. Copenhaver, 64 Wyo. 1, 184 P.2d 594, 608 (1947), declares "delegatus non potest delegare."
This principle should have no impact upon the present proposal since these courts and others
specifically permit the delegation of mere ministerial functions and the use of advisory panels
and experts. See, e.g., N.L.R.B. v. Duval Jewelry Co., 357 U.S. 1, 7 (1958). To make the find-
ings of the researcher binding would run counter to the underlying justification for delegation:
that the final word and ultimate decision on the merits of all issues before the agency must
be left to the agency. Id. at 8.
[Vol. 40:593
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol40/iss4/13












Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1987
OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW
would defuse the Commission's opposition if the results disproved its allega-
tions.
Although this outcome would not be binding, the findings of the study
would still have influence on the decision by the FTC of whether to pursue
the action. Since the study can later be presented as evidence in the adminis-
trative hearing, the agency would be effectively estopped from attacking the
research as defective because the research design was of its own selection.
The fact question would be resolved, leaving only the legal question-what
percentage of the population must be deceived for regulation to ensue-for
resolution by the administrative law judge (ALJ)." This can be done on a
somewhat spurious case-by-case basis, before submission of the research
questions, allowing the ALJ the flexibility to consider factors such as the
type of product and the target audience. Alternatively, this could be done by
regulation.8"
One remaining issue is at what point in the traditional course of events
should this option be made available. It might be possible to offer this alter-
native prior to the time that the Commission staff makes its recommendation
to the Commission to file a complaint, but it is unlikely that either party will
be prepared to incur the expense of survey or experimental research prior to
the complaint being filed. Consequently, the practicalities probably dictate
that the option be made available only after the complaint is filed.
Ethics
Integrity of the research is the predicate of this model's validity as a fact-
finding tool. Ani essential element of ensuring this integrity is a Code of Pro-
fessional Re,;ponsibiity. This ethical code can be compiled by combining
aspects of the Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes,' the
79. Cases have varied greatly in the percentage of the population deemed necessary to be
capable of being deceived before the finding of a "capacity or tendency to deceive" will be
upheld. Percentages as low as 5 percent, A.A. Friedman, 74 F.T.C. 1056, 1071 (1968), and 15
percent, Firestone fire & Rubber Co., 81 F.T.C. 398, 415 (1972), aff'd, 481 F.2d 246 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1112 (1973), have been found sufficient, as have many other percentage
figures. It is doubtful that any numbers this small would be sustained upon a hearing before
the Commission, given its position announced in Cliffdale, 103 F.T.C. 110, 165 (1984), which
purports to protect only consumers who act "reasonably," rather than "that vast multitude which
includes the ignorant, the unthinking and the credulous" which were protected in the past. See,
e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 577 F.2d 653, 657 (9th Cir. 1978); Giant Food, Inc. v. FTC,
322 F.2d 977, 982 n.13 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. dismissed, 376 U.S. 967 (1964). See additional
discussion supra note 26.
80. One commentator has suggested a series of levels for different fact situations: (a) 1-5%
deception level where a product directly involves the health and safety of the public, e.g., over-
the-counter drugs; (b) 10% deception for advertisements aimed solely at children or elderly per-
sons; (c) 15-20% where the harm is strictly economic in nature; and (d) 30-40% where the adver-
tising inflicts only commercial hurt on a competitor. See GERLACH, THE CONSUMER'S MIND: A
PREIMINARY INQUIRY INTO THE EMERGING PROBLEMS OF CONSUMER EVIDENCE AND THE LAW,
(Monograph, Marketing Science Institute Dec. 1972).
81. This Code was prepared by a joint committee composed of a special committee of the
American Arbitration Association and a special committee of the American Bar Association in
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Code of Ethics of the American Sociological Association," and the Code of
Professional Ethics and Practices of the American Association for Public
Opinion Research.
8 3
1977. See Holtzmann, The First Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes, 33 Bus.
LAW. 309 (1977).
82. Toward a Code of Ethics for Sociologists, 3 AM. SocioLoGIsT 316, 318 (1968).
83. K. BAIEY, METHODS OF SocIAL REsEARCH 518 (2d ed. 1982).
The following is offered as a recommended outline for such a code that might be adopted
as an integral part of the ADRM model, composed from the Codes mentioned above:
I. Integrity, Objectivity, and Fairness
A. The scientist has a responsibility to maintain the integrity and objectivity of the
research, and to take all reasonable efforts to be fair to all sides of the factual dispute
which forms the basis for the research question. The scientist has a responsibility to
both the process and the parties, and must observe high standards of conduct to preserve
the integrity, objectivity, and fairness of the research.
B. The ethical obligations of a scientist begin upon the acceptance of the appoint-
ment and continue throughout all stages of the project.
II. Selection and Acceptance of Appointment
A. It is inconsistent with the integrity of the process for scientists to solicit appoint-
ment for themselves.
B. Scientists should accept appointment only if they can be available to conduct the
research promptly.
C. Scientists should accept appointment only if they are qualified by education and
experience to conduct the research in accordance with the parameters of the question
as designated in the submission agreement, and should not misrepresent their own
abilities, or the competence of their staff, to conduct a particular research project.
III. Bias and Financial Interests
After accepting appointment and while serving in the appointment, a scientist should
avoid entering into any financial, business, professional, family, or social relationship,
or acquiring any financial or personal interest which is likely to affect impartiality
or which might reasonably create the appearance of partiality or bias.
IV. Research Process
A. Where the agreement of the parties sets forth procedures to be followed in the
research, it is the obligation of the scientist to comply with such procedures, or to
obtain permission of the parties to make any changes that the scientist deems necessary
or advisable.
B. The scientist shall not select research tools and methods of analysis because of
their special capacity to yield a desired conclusion, and shall not knowingly make in-
terpretations of research results, nor tacitly permit interpretations, which are inconsis-
tent with the data available.
C. Scientists must present their findings honestly and without distortion, omitting
no data from a research report which must significantly modify their interpretation
of findings, and the scientists must indicate with specificity where and how their own
theory, method, research design, or paradigm may bear upon or influence interpretation.
D. Deficiencies or weaknesses known by the scientist to be inherent in the study as
conducted must be fully discussed in the findings, to permit an informed decision to
be founded thereon.
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The implementation of ethical standards in conjunction with the ADRM
procedures will lend confidence to the research findings of the various scien-
tists, helping to give them legal relevance and credence. This allows recourse
by the Commission in the event that research was conducted improperly. Ad-
ditionally, this channel of recourse might discourage the FTC from alleging
impropriety if the study's results are presented in court because the FTC
would then be obliged to prosecute for violation of these ethical regulations,
thereby necessitating that it prove its charges.
A Trial Run
A joint study has been undertaken in at least one case. It did not involve
the procedural approach described above, but it does suggest a possibility for
the FTC and respondents to work together to commission studies.
Yamaha International, Inc.," involved a series of "Learn-To-Ride" safety
seminars sponsored by the manufacturer of motorcycles. The advertising for
these seminars stated, in part, that "the motorcycle is becoming as popular
as the automobile. Yamaha believes-with proper instruction-it can be just
as safe. We invite everyone in America to learn to ride."" The FTC, to the
contrary, felt that no amount of instruction can make a two-wheel unenclosed
vehicle as safe as a four-wheel enclosed vehicle and charged Yamaha with
deceptive advertising." The issues of the case concerned the meaning that
consumers would derive from this advertising-whether it implied exact safe-
ty equivalence between motorcycles and cars-and it was decided that
research could resolve this question. A pilot study, jointly commissioned,
was agreed upon to explore the issues. Following that pilot study, which was
only intended to be preliminary, a more scientifically rigorous study was to
be conducted. Four researchers, two from the FTC and two from Yamaha,
were engaged to work out the research design.
Unfortunately, the example of Yamaha is incomplete because a final study
was never conducted. The pilot study, despite its inadequacies, was so strong-
ly supportive of the FTC position that Yamaha entered into a consent agree-
V. Communications
A. Scieatits shall not communicate with the parties to the controversy except through
the administrator, unless agreed upon in writing by all parties to the controversy.
B. Unless otherwise agreed by all parties, or required by applicable rules of law,
the scientist should keep confidential all matters relating to the research project and
findings.
C. It is not proper at any time for the scientist, or anyone working with or for the
scientist, to inform anyone of the research findings in advance of the time they are
given to all parties.
84. 86 F.T.C. 973 (1974).
85. Id. at 976-77.
86. Hunt, The FTC-Yamaha Joint Research Project, in DIsPUTE MANAGEMENT: A MANUAL
OF INNOVATIVE CORPORATE STRATEGIES FOR THE AVOIDANCE AND RESOLUTION OF LEGAL DIsPuTES
(Ctr. for Pub. Res. 1980).
[Vol. 40:593
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol40/iss4/13
19871 DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCESS FOR FTC 617
ment without further convincing."7 Litigation was avoided and, unlike many
other consent agreements, it was based upon the merits of the case rather
than a desire to circumvent detrimental publicity or litigation expenses.
Conclusion
This article has discussed the need for innovation in advertising regulation
and some steps that might easily be adopted to introduce such progress. In-
struments are readily available to the regulators that can significantly reduce
the amount of speculation applied in determining the salient facts at issue in
these cases. The advocates presenting the cases are largely responsible for the
failure to utilize these tools, but the onus should now be on the Commission
to make it easier to offer empirical data into evidence or to avoid the need
for litigation.
The first step in this process is for the Commission to promulgate, as either
industry guides or regulations, a basic outline as to what it considers suffi-
cient scientific methods to measure advertising effects (and to substantiate
advertising claims88). This should include both a general, broadly defined
87. Id.
88. In addition to research on advertising content (and substantiation), policies regarding
scientific evidence might also be tailored to instances where the Commission staff seeks the inclu-
sion of corrective measures in a challenged campaign. Corrective advertising is a relatively recent
development, legitimized by Warner-Lambert Co. v. FTC, 562 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 435 U.S. 950 (1978). See also Recent Cases, The Federal Trade Commission Has the
Power to Order Corrective Advertising in Cases Where the Lingering Effect of Prior Advertising
Influences Future Consumer Decisions, 47 U. Cn . L. REv. 129 (1978). In his 1976 argument
for the inclusion of such powers, Professor Cornfeld proposed the use of empirical consumer
data as a litmus test for determining whether a lingering impression persists in the minds of
consumers sufficient to justify a remedy so potentially detrimental to the targeted advertiser.
Cornfeld, A New Approach to an Old Remedy: Corrective Advertising and the Federal Trade
Commission, 61 IowA L. REv. 639 (1976). This article advocates retention of the corrective adver-
tising mechanism, but was written just prior to the Warner-Lambert decision. This followed
several litigated cases, beginning with Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 81 F.T.C. 398 (1972), in
which the FTC considered demands for corrective advertising that were not well supported by
evidence.
When the Commission considered corrective advertising for Firestone, the proferred evidence
on retention of beliefs by consumers was based on advertisements in general; there was no evidence
directly on the contested tire ads. The advertising had been discontinued for four years, and
by that time there may well have been no lingering effect of the prior deceptive practices. It
is possible, if not probable, that consumers who were affected by the older "deceptive" advertis-
ing will no longer remember or be under the influence of those ads. An advertiser need not
be extraordinarily intuitive to recognize the advantage under these circumstances of exercising
the option to assess consumer beliefs before deciding to assume the expense of arguing with
the FTC in court. It would be equally advantageous for the FTC to study these impacts before
facing impending embarrassment in such a case.
A further appropriate use of consumer evidence, though not addressed in the present discus-
sion, would be in the formulation of an effective corrective message. The dilution of FTC-proposed
corrections, like that found in Warner-Lambert, demonstrates a probable misunderstanding by
the judiciary of the nature of human communication processes and the sufficiency of a minimized
corrective message to serve the goals of the agency. While there is no evidence that the Commis-
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methodology, as well as some specific examples of presumptively acceptable
techniques. This would assist companies in collecting empirical data so that
their efforts are not spent fruitlessly. Failure to provide these parameters is at
the very least unfair to advertisers and, in certain instances, might be
vulnerable to a charge of being unconstitutionally violative of due process.
8 9
The next step is to take further advantage of empirical studies, by applying
them to the early resolution of disputes over the deceptive likelihood of
advertisements. This can be accomplished by the FTC and the advertiser
commissioning joint research and bearing the costs equally.
These two steps have been presented as an integral process, but this is a
slight oversimplification. The two are more precisely described as separate
potential approaches to measuring the meaning of advertisements. If the
FTC were to implement the first step (see part I), future assessments of the
deceptiveness or nondeceptiveness of advertisements would be much more
systematic and consistent. They would be less likely to be undertaken un-
necessarily because their methodology would be less vulnerable to attack.
Adoption of this stage, alone, would also substantially improve the current
litigation process. Likewise, the second step (see part II) could be pursued in
absence of the first because the two parties will have acquiesced to the
employment of the researcher, thereby implicitly accepting the methods to be
chosen by that researcher.
While they can be viewed as alternative solutions, they are highly interac-
tive. Neither of these steps is alone as effective as the two acting together.
The first step is useful to the effective finding of fact, but it offers no
mechanism for extrajudicial dispute resolution. The second step promises to
assist in the avoidance of litigation, but from it might come little consistency
and the researcher's determinations would be more susceptible to challenge
on methodological grounds. Clearly, the interrelation of these two stages
makes adoption of both the preferred course of action.
Although Yamaha represents a trial run of the basic concept discussed here
and in that case it worked to the benefit of the FTC, no systematic procedure
sion has used consumer research to identify the most appropriate message to correct prior
misconceptions, one cease and desist order prohibited the depiction of fruit or juice on a product
label until suth time as consumer surveys reveal that deceptive effects of the prior labeling do
not exceed specified percentages. RJR Foods, Inc., 83 F.T.C. 7 (1973).
This application of behavioral studies is especially valuable to ensure that the parameters laid
down in the name of the first amendment are not breached. "[The first amendment] triggers
a special responsibility of the Commission to order corrective advertising only if the restriction
inherent in its order is no greater than necessary to serve the interest involved." Warner-Lambert,
562 F.2d at 758. This use of consumer research could, therefore, circumvent a charge that the
corrective order is constitutionally overbroad.
89. Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566 (1974). Justice Powell, in the majority opinion, remarks
that a regulation without narrow specificity is void for vagueness. He states further that this
doctrine "incorporates notions of fair notice or warning .... [l]t requires legislatures to set
reasonably clear guidelines for law enforcement officials and triers of fact in order to prevent
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has been established to encourage this approach. This article has outlined
such a procedure, which could serve as a foundation for future regulatory
policy regarding the use of behavioral research.
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